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WILLIAM M. SHARP & BETTY K. STEELE*

The Caribbean Basin Exchange of
Information Draft AgreementA Technical Analysis
I. Introduction to the Agreement

A.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

In 1983 Congress enacted the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
("Act"), which became effective January 1, 1984.1 The Act, commonly
referred to as the "Caribbean Basin Initiative" (CBI), amended both U.S.
income tax and trade laws to encourage bilateral trade and investment
between U.S.-based operations and the Caribbean countries covered by the
CBI. 2 The final version of the Act, however, deleted two important U.S.
income tax provisions-"tax sparing," and investment credits for direct
*Mr. Sharp and Ms. Steele practice with Jacobs, Robbins, Gaynor, Burton, Hampp, Burns,
Bronstein, & Shasteen, P.A., Tampa, Florida. This article is partially based on a speech
delivered by Mr. Sharp at the Caribbean Basin Initiative Planning Seminar (entitled "The First
Annual Caribbean Update"), sponsored by the International Law Section of the Florida Bar in
Miami, Florida, on December 3, 1984.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2701 etseq.). For a general
overview of Pub. L. No. 98-67, see Zagaris, A Caribbean Perspective of the CaribbeanBasin
Initiative, 18 INT'L LAW. 563 (Summer 1984) [hereinafter referred to as Zagaris]; see also The
Florida Bar, The FirstAnnual Caribbean Update (December 3, 1984) and Zagaris, Caribbean
Basin Initiative, 48 TAXES INTERNATIONAL 7 (October 1983).
2. See Sections 213 and 221-223 of the Act. For additional background regarding the Act's
legislative history, see Zagaris supra note 1, at pp. 563-64. Many CBI beneficiaries, since
passage of the Act, have utilized the CBI exporter's declaration/importer's endorsement form
in order to obtain duty free treatment for their products in the United States. From January
through September 1984, this amounted to $429,600,000 of imports to the U.S. U.S. DEPT.
COMMERCE, BUSINESS AMERICA 8 (Jan. 7, 1985).
Countries participating in the CBI enjoyed substantial growth in two-way trade with the
U.S., according to Commerce Department year-end figures released in February 1985. CBIeligible imports from designated countries in 1984 increased by about 17 percent or $555
million-compared to a 26 percent decline for countries that are eligible but do not participate
in the CBI. U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE BUSINESS BULLETIN 1 (March
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investment in Caribbean Basin countries by U.S. companies. 3 Accordingly,
the overall benefit of the CBI is somewhat limited to trade and tourism, with
little effect on direct investment by U.S. businesses into Caribbean Basin
countries.

B.

SCOPE

This article will not review the Act's trade provisions, which generally
confer duty-free treatment to the importation into the U.S. from CBI
countries of certain qualified articles. 4 Rather, it will focus on the U.S. tax
aspects of the Act, with particular emphasis on the Act's "exchange of
information" provision. 5
The Act's exchange-of-information provisions represent a potential legal
pitfall for those foreign investment transactions in which maintenance of
anonymity of the underlying foreign investors is desired. Such provisions
also represent a potential problem to United States companies which are
doing business in the Caribbean Basin and which otherwise seek limited
disclosure of their worldwide business operations to a particular Caribbean
Basin government. However, the potential problem of disclosure of tax
information under the Act may be ameliorated by the terms of final exchange of information agreements, which may have provisions far more
lenient than the Act's draft version. As will be discussed, the U.S. exchangeof-information agreement with Barbados has omitted certain onerous provisions contained in the Act's draft exchange-of-information agreement. This,
of course, renders the application of the Act less problematic than the draft
exchange of information.
Nevertheless, the U.S. practitioner should carefully and critically review
an exchange-of-information provision entered into under the Act between
the United States and a particular Caribbean Basin country for both "inbound" and "outbound" international business transactions. The particular
data collection, transmissions and enforcement provisions of such a final
exchange-of-information agreement could result in unintended disclosures
to both U.S. and foreign government officials of confidential and proprietary information, including financial data, personal information and possibly trade secrets. By technically analyzing not only the Act's draft agree-

3. See H.R. 5900 and S. 2237.
4. See sections 213 et al. of the Act; 19 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(1). The revised Customs CBI
regulations, published December 7, 1984, in the Federal Register, 19 C.F.R. 10 (1984), went
into effect January 7, 1985. Most significant among the many changes is that Customs will
accept the GSP Certificate of Origin Form A in lieu of the exporter's declaration/importer's
endorsement forms used for CBI imports in 1984. U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, Caribbean Basin
Initiative Business Bulletin 1 (Feb. 1985).
5. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 17-75.
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ment (Draft Agreement) but also the first actual agreement entered into
between the United States and a Caribbean Basin country, this article ought
to better equip the U.S. practitioner in representation of international
business clients doing business in, and through, Caribbean Basin countries.
II. U.S. Tax Aspects of the Act
The Act amended Section 274 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended (hereinafter the Code), 6 to enable U.S. taxpayers to deduct
reasonable, ordinary and necessary business expenses 7 incurred in connection with attending certain foreign conventions, seminars, or similar meetings, if the following three conditions are met:
1) Only Caribbean Basin countries designated under the Act as "beneficiaries" by the U.S. Treasury Department qualify. 8 (It should be
noted, however, that Bermuda is included in this list even though it
was not originally included as an "eligible" beneficiary country under
the Act. 9)
2) The designated "beneficiary" country must enter into an exchangeof-information agreement with the U.S. Treasury Department, pursuant to which the parties to such agreement will share certain taxrelated information, as described below. 10
3) The designated "beneficiary" country may not discriminate by
reason of its internal tax laws against conventions, seminars, and
similar meetings held in the U.S."1
In addition to deductibility for foreign conventions, the CBI's exchangeof-information requirement also directly affects other important provisions
of the Code dealing with foreign sales corporations and withholding tax
appeals. A "foreign sales corporation" ' 12 may be organized under the laws of
6. Under IRC § 274 prior to its amendment by the Act, expenses incurred by a U.S. taxpayer
in connection with foreign business conventions were deductible only if the conventions,
seminars or similar meetings were held in the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and certain other limited
areas. (IRC § 274(h) prior to passage of the Act.) If a foreign convention was held outside of this
region, a significant barrier for deductibility was for the taxpayer to demonstrate that the
particular location was as reasonable as a domestic location. (IRC § 274(h)(1) prior to passage
of the Act.)
7. These expenses must otherwise qualify under IRC §§ 162 or 212.
8. IRC § 274(h)(6)(B). It should be noted that IRC § 274(h)(6) amended the definition of
"North American area" to include CBI countries which meet the conditions described in the
text at notes 8-11 so that the onerous restriction for non-"North American area" conventions
discussed in the text at note 14 will not apply.
9. IRC § 274(h)(6)(B) (see § 212(a)(1)(A) of the Act).
10. IRC § 274(h)(6)(A)(i); see also discussion in text accompanying notes 17-75.
11. IRC § 274(h)(6)(A)(ii).
12. See IRC §§ 921-927 (1983). For a general discussion of the foreign sales corporation
area, see Block, Gilbert and Kuenster, Transitionfrom DISC to a Foreign Sales Corporation:
Tax and Other Considerations, 19 INT'L LAW. 343 (1985); Sharp, Steele & Jacobson, Foreign
SUMMER 1985
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a foreign jurisdiction with which the United States has either entered into an
income tax treaty, whose exchange-of-information provision has been "certified" by the U.S. Treasury Department, or 13 entered into an exchange-ofinformation agreement under Section 274(h)(6)(C) of the Code. 1 4 (Except
for Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, no other treaties between the U.S.
and Caribbean Basin countries have been certified in accordance with (a)
above. 15) Otherwise non-taxable interest payments with respect to "portfolio indebtedness" made to foreign persons may be subject to United States
withholding tax treatment if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that
the exchange of information between the U.S. and foreign 1country
in
6
question is inadequate to prevent tax evasion by U.S. persons.
III. Exchange of Information Agreements
A.

STATUTORY ANALYSIS

As noted above, to obtain U.S. income tax deductions for Caribbean
Basin conventions, one of the principal statutory requirements is that the
particular "designated beneficiary" country shall have entered into a suitable "exchange of information" agreement with the U.S. Treasury
Department. 17 The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to negotiate and
conclude an exchange-of-information agreement with any "beneficiary"
18
country.
Generally, an exchange-of-information agreement must provide for the
exchange of such information as may be "necessary or appropriate" to carry
out and enforce the tax laws of the U.S. and the beneficiary country. 19 The
exchange of information may be for both criminal or civil proceedings, and
the information in question is not limited to information concerning nationals or residents of the U.S. or the beneficiary country. 20 Under this standard,
the U.S. may request information concerning the tax affairs of a foreign
investor structuring investments through the beneficiary country who is not
necessarily a resident or national of either such beneficiary country or of the
Sales Corporations:Export Analysis and Planning,63 TAXES 163 (1985); Zagaris, Foreign Sales
Corporations,60 TAXES INTERNATIONAL 3 (Oct. 1984); and Reynolds & Zuckerman, FOREIGN
SALES CORPORATIONS, 59 TAXES INTERNATIONAL 3 (Sept. 1984).
13. IRC § 927(e)(3)(ii).
14. Id.
15. Treasury Department Release R-2918 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 9910 (November 8,
1984). The Bahamas now has the opportunity to become an eligible domicile for the establishment of foreign sales corporations. TAXES ON PARADE (CCH) 7 (March 20, 1985).
16. IRC § 871(h)(5).
17. This requirement (as well as the other two elements discussed in the text at notes 10 and
11) must be met "as of the time such" convention begins. IRC § 274(h)(6)(A).
18. IRC § 274(h)(6)(C)(i).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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U.S. 2 1

Information gathered by either country under the exchange-of-information agreement will be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including
courts and administrative bodies) involved in the administration or overof appeals in respect of, taxes of the U.S. or
sight of, or in the determination
22
the beneficiary country.
Perhaps most important, information subject to an exchange-ofinformation agreement is not limited or otherwise subject to nondisclosure
provisions of the local law of the beneficiary country, e.g., bank secrecy and
bearer share provisions.2 3 However, certain "qualified confidential information" need not be included in an exchange-of-information agreement,
assuming certain conditions are met.24
An exchange-of-information agreement need not provide for the exchange of "qualified confidential information ' 25 if the following statutory
conditions are met: (a) The qualified confidential information is sought only
for civil tax purposes; 26 (b) The Secretary of the Treasury, after making all
reasonable efforts to negotiate an agreement which includes the exchange of
such information, determines in his discretion that such an agreement
cannot be negotiated, but that an agreement excluding such information
requests would significantly assist in the administration and enforcement of
U.S. tax law; 27 and (c) The President determines that the agreement as
negotiated is in the national security interests of the U.S. 28 The term
"qualified confidential information" means information which is subject to
country
the nondisclosure provisions of any local law of the beneficiary
29
shares.
bearer
or
ownership
or
secrecy
bank
regarding
Effective January 1, 1985, any exchange-of-information agreement
negotiated under the above requirements will be treated as an income tax
convention for purposes of the Code. 30 As a result of this rule, CBI exchange-of-information agreements will be on an equal footing with U.S. tax
treaties for code purposes.3 1
21. This represents a significant discovery tool for the U.S. Treasury Department, however,
the U.S. Treasury Department apparently may not freely transmit such information to the
"home" country of the individual who is neither a resident nor national of the beneficiary
country. Such a conditional transmittal provision may be violative of the restrictive provision
contained in IRC § 274(h)(6)(C)(i) (1983). See infra discussion in text accompanying notes
27-29.
22. IRC § 274(h)(6)(C)(i).
23. Id.
24. See IRC § 274(h)(6)(C)(ii).
25. Id. For a definition of this term, see infra discussion in text accompanying note 29.
26. IRC § 274(h)(6)(C)(ii).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. IRC § 274(h)(6)(C)(iii).
30. IRC § 274(h)(6)(D).
31. See IRC § 6103(k)(4).
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B. DISCUSSION DRAFT
In July 1984, the U.S. Treasury Department released a discussion of an
agreement for the exchange of information in accordance with the statutory
standards discussed above. 32 Although the Draft Agreement is based
largely upon Article 26 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, the
Draft Agreement has an expanded scope in many areas. 33 According to the
comments to the Draft Agreement, a final agreement entered into between
the U.S. and a designated beneficiary country apparently need not contain
all provisions of the Draft Agreement.34 However, it is unlikely that the
U.S. Treasury Department would have statutory authority to substantially
deviate from those requirements set forth in the Code, as amended by the
Act.

35

As of November 13, 1984, the U.S. had entered into an exchange-ofinformation agreement substantially in accordance with the Draft Agreement with Barbados. 36 In addition, the U.S. has agreed in principle to enter
into an exchange-of-information agreement under the Act with Costa
Rica. 37 In particular, the Treasury Department referenced the consummation of the exchange-of-information agreements with respect to the foreign
sales corporation legislation.38
C. OBSERVATIONS

The following generally reviews various articles of the Draft Agreement,
and planning considerations pertinent to it.
Article 1 (Object and Scope)-This provision follows the statutory lan-

guage of Section 274(h)(6)(C): the information subject to the exchange-ofinformation convention may pertain to individuals who are neither residents
nor nationals of either contracting state.39
32. Treasury Department News Release R-2780 TAX TREATIES (CCH)
175 (July 24,
1984); see also discussion in the text accompanying notes 8-31 supra and prescribed by IRC
§ 274(h)(6)(C), as originally prescribed by Section 222 of the Act (herein referred to as the
Draft Agreement).
33. U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty (June 16, 1981).
34. Comments to the Draft Agreement (Introduction), supra note 32.
35. See § 274(h)(6)(C).
36. Treasury Department News Release R-2913, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 9911 (November
6, 1984); moreover, the U.S. and Barbados recently concluded a bilateral income tax treaty,
Article 26 of which is generally consistent with the exchange-of-information agreement discussed herein. See DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 21, at page J-12 (January 31, 1985). For a
discussion of the United States Barbadoes exchange-of-information treaty entered into under
the Act, see infra discussion in text accompanying notes 76-143.
37. Treasury Department News Release R-2918, TAX TREATIES (CCH) 9909 (November 8,
1984). The Costa Rican agreement will not become effective until signed by representatives of
both countries and ratified by the legislative bodies of both countries after which diplomatic
letters will be exchanged.
38. See supra discussion in text accompanying note 12.
39. See supra discussion in text accompanying note 21.
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Article 2 (Taxes Covered)-This provision is broad in scope, and contrary
to the U.S. Model Treaty, covers all types of taxes, including income,
self-employment, estate and gift taxes, as well as excise taxes.4n It also
contains a provision which applies the scope of the Draft Agreement to taxes
enacted and imposed after the date of entering into an exchange-ofinformation agreement, so long as such taxes are substantially similar to the
then-existing taxes covered by the agreement. 41 This provision notes that a
the contracting
contracting state may only request such information which 42
limitations.
of
statute
applicable
its
within
use
might
state
Taxes imposed by states, municipalities or other political subdivisions, or
are specifically excluded from coverage
possessions of a contracting state,
43
Agreement.
Draft
the
under
Article 3 (Definitions)-Article 3 of the Draft Agreement sets forth a

variety of definitions for interpreting the Draft Agreement. One of the most
important definitions is the term "information," which is defined as any fact
or statement, in any form whatever, that may be relevant or material to tax
administration and enforcement, including testimony, documents, records,
or tangible personal property.44 In the event a term is not defined in the
Draft Agreement, the domestic law of the contracting state applying the
Draft Agreement shall control unless the parties otherwise agree.4 5
Article 4 (Exchange-of-Information)-Thisprovision is the key to opera-

tion of an exchange-of-information agreement under the Act, and widely
divergent from the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty. The following discussion is organized with reference to the various numerical paragraphs contained in Article 4 of the Draft Agreement.
Paragraph 1 provides that the competent authorities of the contracting
states shall exchange information to administer and enforce the domestic
laws of the contracting states concerning the taxes covered by the
Agreement.4 6 This broad purposes clause goes beyond coverage for substantive tax law matters only; indeed, information may be requested under
this provision with respect to, and at any stage of, a civil or criminal tax
matter of the contracting state requesting the information. 47 Also, no re40. Draft Agreement, supra note 36 at Article 2.
41. Id.
42. Id.See IRC § 6501(a).
43. Id. This provision corresponds to Article 26 (6) of the U.S. Model Treaty.
44. Draft Agreement, supra note 36 at Article 3. Based on this definition, information
subject to the exchange provisions under the Draft Agreement apparently is not limited by the
form in which it exists. (Comments to the Draft Agreement (Article 3) supra note 36.
45. Comments to the Draft Agreement (Article 3). Under this article, a contracting state
which requests information is referred to as an "applicant state," and the contracting state
receiving such request is known as a "requested state."
46. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 1, Article 4.
47. Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 1, Article 4), supra note 36.
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quirement exists whereby a formal tax matter or proceeding must be in
process before a request may be made. 4 8 This approach corresponds with
the statutory analysis in order49 to carry out the tax laws of the U.S. as
"necessary and appropriate.", This paragraph apparently provides the
authorization for the contracting states to develop, implement and operate
an informational exchange system for' 5°"specific requests" and also for
"simultaneous examination programs.
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 authorizes the competent authorities to establish
' Competent
"routine exchanges of information. " 51
authorities shall determine which items of information shall be automatically transmitted via such
routine procedures. 52 The "routine exchange" procedure between contracting states typically involves the periodic transmission of routine tax information from one competent authority of a contracting state to the competent
authority of another state. 53 Such information usually pertains to investof
ment income (or withholding taxes related thereto) paid by a taxpayer
54
one contracting state to a taxpayer in the other contracting state.
An example of tax information subject to the "routine exchange" procedure is the annual information return on Form 1042S required to be filed by
all U.S. withholding agents with respect to "tax required to be withheld"
under the withholding provisions of the Code. 55 Unless certain exceptions
are met, information contained in Form 1042S must be transmitted by the
IRS to the treaty designated competent authority. 56 Paragraph 2 of Article 4 notes that the competent authorities to the Draft Agreement shall
procedure,
determine precisely what tax information will be subject to this
57
which in all likelihood follow the approach discussed above.
Paragraph 3 of Article 4 authorizes a competent authority of a contracting
state to exchange information "spontaneously" with the competent authority of the other state. 58 Before a spontaneous transmission may be made,
however, the competent authority must determine that such information is
likely to be relevant to, and bear significantly on, a tax matter in the other
state before it will initiate a spontaneous exchange. 59 The "spontaneous
48. Id.

49. Id. See IRC § 274(h)(6)(C)(i); see also discussion in text accompanying note 22 supra.
50. Id. The detailed IRS guidelines for the usual treaty "specific request" procedure can be
found in the INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL. See I.R.M. (Audit) Pt. IV, ch. 4200 § 42 (10).
51. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 2, Article 4.
52. Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 2, Article 4), supra note 36.
53. Id.
54. The INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL contains a detailed "routine exchange" procedure. See
I.R.M. (Audit) Pt. IV, ch. 4200 § 42 (10).
55. IRC § 1441 etseq. and Treas. Reg. § 1.1461-2(b)(1).
56. Treas. Reg. § 1.1461-2(b).
57. See supra notes 50 and 54.
58. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 3, Article 4.
59. Id. However, the precise rules for making such determinations are not defined by the
Draft Agreement or the comments thereto, and are to be defined by the competent authorities.
VOL. 19, NO. 3

CARIBBEAN BASIN EXCHANGE

957

exchange" procedure between contracting states to an exchange-of-information agreement usually applies when a competent authority of a contracting state determines that certain information, not ordinarily covered by the
"routine exchange" procedure, would be of fiscal interest to the other
60
contracting state.
Paragraph 4 authorizes the competent authority of the requested state to
provide to an applicant state information not only available in its tax files,
but also to take all relevant measures, including compulsory measures, to
provide the applicant state with the information requested. 6 1 Certain safeguards are built into the procedures to ensure that the contracting state to
which a request has been made has adequate "legal process" for obtaining
the information or that it can enact measures providing for such legal
process.62

Perhaps the most important provision of the Draft Agreement is contained in paragraph 4(b), which provides that the laws or practices of the
requested state pertaining to disclosure of information by banks, nominees
or persons acting in an agency or fiduciary capacity, or respecting ownership
of debt instruments or interests in a person shall not prevent or otherwise
affect the authority of the requested state described above. 63 This particular
provision is specifically required by Section 274(h)(6)(C)(i) of the Code;
however, this provision need not be included in a final exchange of agreement if the internal law of the contracting state does
not allow bank secrecy
64
or undisclosed ownership of shares or security.
Equally important is subparagraph 4(c) of Article 4, which provides that
privileges under the laws of the applicant state shall not apply in the
execution of a request by the requested state but shall be preserved for
resolution by the applicant state.65 The purpose of this rule is to prohibit
courts of the requested state from adjudicating the legality of such privileges
asserted under the laws of the applicant state.6 6
Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 4, a requested state is authorized to
obtain information requested by an applicant state in the same manner as if
the requested state's own system of taxation were involved, even though the
requested state may not need such information. 67 However, this provision
also provides that additional information must be obtained by the compe-

60. See I.R.M. (Audit) Pt. IV, ch. 4200 § 42 (10).
61. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 4, Art. 4.
62. The United States has adequate process under IRC § 7601. Comments to the Draft
Agreement (paragraph 4, Article 4).
63. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 4(b), Article 4.
64. Id.
65. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 4(c), Article 4.
66. Comments to Draft Agreement (paragraph 4(c), Article 4), supra note 36.
67. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 5, Article 4.
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tent authority of the68 requested state in the manner and form requested by
the applicant state.

Paragraph 6 provides that with the exception of paragraph 4(b) and
paragraph 5, as discussed above, the information-gathering requirements of
the Draft Agreement are not intended to impose on a contracting state the
obligation to engage in any activities which would result in any of the

following actions: carry out administrative measures in variance with the
laws and administrative practices of that state or of the contracting state;
supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal
course of the administration of either state; supply information which would
disclose a trade, business or other secret and proprietary information and
processes; or supply information, the disclosure of which would be contrary
to public policy. 69 It should be noted that paragraph 6 substantially differs
from the U.S. Model Treaty because the latter treaty does not require a
contracting state to have any particular authority to collect the nature and
type of information set forth in paragraph 4(a) without limitation by local

rules requiring secrecy about ownership of bank accounts or bearer shares. 70
This same paragraph also contains a nondiscrimination clause in paragraph
6(e), which is substantially similar to the U.S. Model Treaty definition, and
7t
follows the statutory mandate as discussed above.

The comments to the Draft Agreement indicate that because of the
secrecy requirements, 72 information received by an applicant state from a
requested state may not be disclosed to authorities of another country

without permission from the requested state.73 This provision would seem
to preclude abusive retransmission or information gathered by an applicant
68. Id. The overall objective of this provision is to provide the "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" that a U.S. court may require for purposes of evidence admissibility. See FED. RULES EVID., Rule 803(24) or 804(5).
69. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 6, Article 4.
70. Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 6, Article 4), supra note 36.
71. Id. The following additional subparagraphs are also contained in Article 4: (i) the
obligation on both contracting states to use all legal means and their best efforts to execute a
request, (ii) to allow representatives of the applicant state to enter the requested state to
interview individuals and to examine books and records (with the consent of the individuals
contacted), and (iii) to clarify that any information received by a contracting state shall be
treated as a secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that
state (and the use of such information will pertain solely to such internal domestic legal
limitations). (Paragraphs 7, 8, and 9, Article 4, Draft Agreement.) It should be noted that
although the paragraph dealing with allowance of representatives to enter a contracting state
apparently would not add additional local authority to compel disclosure, the presence of such
individuals as a practical matter apparently would aid in the assistance of gathering information. Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 8, Article 4). No similar provision is
contained in the U.S. Model Treaty. For purposes of the secrecy provision, as discussed above,
a U.S. grand jury is considered to be a judicial body in which the disclosure of such information
may be made. Id. (paragraph 9, Article 4).
72. See supra discussion in text accompanying note 69.
73. Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 9, Article 4), supra note 36.
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state as a part of the exchange-of-information process. 74 However, it is
unclear under what circumstances permission would be given by the requested state. In view of this provision, it will generally be ill-advised to

structure investments in the U.S. through CBI country corporations by
foreign persons who are not residents of the particular CBI country and who
desire to avoid disclosure of their identity.75

D.

THE BARBADOS EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AGREEMENT

The United States entered into an exchange-of-information agreement
substantially in accordance with the Draft Agreement with Barbados on
November 3, 1984, and on November 2, 1984, the U.S. agreed in principle
to enter into an exchange-of-information agreement with Costa Rica.76
While no draft exchange-of-information agreement is available for Costa
Rica (and will not be available until effective), the Barbados exchange-ofinformation agreement has been released. 77
The U.S. and Barbados also signed a proposed income tax treaty on
December 31, 1984.78 The Treaty has been transmitted to the Senate for
its advice and consent to ratification. 79 The provisions of the Barbados
exchange-of-information agreement are generally stricter than the exchange-of-information provisions contained in Article 26 of the Treaty. 8 °
This is not surprising inasmuch as the exchange-of-information provisions
contained in most income tax treaties would probably not qualify under the

standards presented by section 274(h)(6)(C). 81 In addition, section
927(e)(3), relating to exchange-of-information requirements for foreign
sales corporations, provides that an exchange-of-information agreement

satisfying section 274(h)(6)(C) is sufficient, while an income tax treaty in
74. Id.
75. In many instances nonresident aliens who invest in the U.S. utilize a variety of corporate
and trust vehicles in order to avoid disclosure of their underlying identities to the U.S. and state
governments. More often than not, the foreign investor is not overly concerned with disclosure
to the U.S. government, but typically the foreign investor is more concerned about the
re-transmission of proprietary information by the U.S. government to the foreign investor's
country of origin government pursuant to bilateral exchange-of-information agreements. See F.
Pedersen, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REPORTING, BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO #428-2nd
(1984); Richards, Telling the Taxman: Reporting and Avoidance under FIRPTA, 17 REAL
PROPERTY TAX J. (March 1982); Foster, Reporting and Disclosure of ConfidentialInformation,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 323 (PL1 1982).

76. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 36 and 37.
77. 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 9858.
78. See supra note 360. The proposed U.S.-Barbados Income Tax Treaty is hereinafter
referred to as the Treaty.
79. Id.
80. Treaty, supra note 36, Article 26. See generally Foster & Pennick, Barbados Signs the
First Exchange of Information Agreement Under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, TAX
MANAGEMENT INT'L J. 100, 102 (March 1985) [hereinafter referred to as Foster & Pennick].
81. Foster & Pennick, supra note 80, at 101.
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and of itself is insufficient. 82 Therefore, while Barbados will have, as soon as
it is ratified by the Senate, a bilateral income tax treaty with the United
States, in order to qualify as a jurisdiction as of the January 1, 1985, effective
date for foreign sales corporations and in order for U.S. taxpayers to deduct
Barbados convention expenses, Barbados apparently chose to enter into an
exchange-of-information agreement with the United States in November
1984.
The purpose of this section is to review the provisions of the Barbados
exchange-of-information agreement 83 with respect to the Draft Agreement
and to discuss any variations therefrom, and to raise practical suggestions
regarding structuring investments in light of the Barbados Agreement.
1. Object and Scope

The object and scope of the Draft Agreement follows the statutory
language of section 274(h)(6)(C), that is, it is the enabling provision which
gives the Secretary of the Treasury the power to enter into exchange-ofinformation agreements.8 4 The Draft Agreement also provides that information must be exchanged without regard as to whether individuals are
residents or nationals of either contracting state.85 However, paragraph 2 of
Article 1 of the Draft Agreement governing the applicability of the exchange-of-information agreement to individuals who are neither residents
nor nationals of either contracting state has been included in paragraph 1 of
Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement. 86 Apparently, however, such information may not be freely transmitted to the "home" country of an
individual who is neither a resident nor a national of the beneficiary country
because such transmittal could be in violation of the restrictive provision
contained in section 274(h)(6)(C)(i). 8 7
2. Taxes Covered

As to Article 2 of the Draft Agreement, which provides for the categories
of taxes to be covered under the exchange-of-information agreement for the
U.S., this has been adopted as Article 1 of the Barbados Agreement. 88 The
taxes covered in the case of Barbados are Income Tax (including premium
income tax), Corporation Tax (including the tax on branch profits) and its
Petroleum Winning Operations Tax.8 9 No other Barbados taxes are covered
82. Id.

83. The "Barbados exchange of information agreement" will be referred to hereinafter as
the "Barbados Agreement."
84. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, Article 1; IRC § 274(h)(6)(C).
85. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, Article 1 (1983).
86. Paragraph 1, Article 3, Barbados Agreement, supra note 83.
87. See discussion in text accompanying note 21; see supra, note 24.
88. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 40-43; Barbados Agreement, supra
note 83, Article 1.
89. Id.
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by the Barbados Agreement. 90 It is interesting to note that with respect to
the U.S., all of the taxes covered by the Draft Agreement have been
included in the Barbados Agreement even though Barbados has only a
limited list of its taxes covered. 91
3. Definitions
Article 3 of the Draft Agreement, which contains all definitional
provisions, is set forth in a truncated form as Article 2 of the Barbados
Agreement. 92 As was noted above, the term "information" contained in the

Draft Agreement is one of the most important definitions in Article 3.93 This
broad definition has been omitted from the Barbados Agreement. 94 As was

noted in the Comments to the Draft Agreement, this definition clarifies that
the information to be exchanged under an exchange-of-information agreement is limited solely by reference to whether it is relevant or material to a
legitimate tax interest of either contracting state and not by the form in
which it exists. 95 Omission of this provision from the Barbados Agreement
indicates that the form of information to be exchanged may be relevant as to
whether such information is obtainable by the contracting states and information could be limited to only information normally in the files of the
appropriate taxing authorities.
4. Exchange of Information
Article 4 of the Draft Agreement, which is Article 3 of the Barbados
Agreement, is the central thrust to the Act's exchange-of-information
agreement.96 The following discussion compares the various paragraphs

90. Barbados has, among other taxes, an estate tax.

PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN

27 (1980). It should be noted that Article 1 of the Barbados Agreement contains the
same provisions as Article 2 of the Draft Agreement with respect to: (1) the application of the
Barbados Agreement to taxes enacted or imposed after the date of entering into the Barbados
Agreement which are similar to taxes already covered; (2) nonapplication of the Barbados
Agreement to the extent that an action or proceeding concerning taxes covered by the
Barbados Agreement is barred by application of either U.S. or Barbados statutes of limitation;
and (3) nonapplication to taxes imposed by state, municipalities or other political subdivisions,
or possessions of either the U.S. or Barbados. Barbados Agreement, supra note 83, Article 1.
91. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, Article 2. It was stated in the technical explanation of
the Draft Agreement that certain countries may not be willing or able to provide assistance for
all national taxes. Comments to the Draft Agreement (Article 2).
92. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 44-45.
93. See supra discussion in text accompanying note 48. "Information" means any fact or
statement, in any form whatsoever, that may be relevant or material to tax administration and
enforcement, including testimony, documents, records, or tangible personal property. Draft
Agreement, supra note 36, Article 1.
94. Barbados Agreement supra note 83, Article 2; Draft Agreement, supra note 36,
Article 3.
95. Comments to the Draft Agreement (Article 3).
96. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 46-75.
BARBADOS
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contained in Article 4 and Article 3 of the Draft Agreement and the
Barbados Agreement, respectively.
a. Scope
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement states that the competent
authorities of the contracting states shall exchange information to administer and enforce the domestic laws of the contracting states concerning taxes
covered in the Draft Agreement. 97 This provision is also contained in the
Barbados Agreement in paragraph 1 of Article 3.98 However, paragraph 1
of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement further provides that information, for
purposes of the Draft Agreement, includes information to effect the determination, assessment, and collection of tax, the recovery and enforcement
of tax claims, or the investigation or prosecution of tax crimes or crimes
involving the contravention of tax administration. 99 This clause has been
omitted from paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement. 1°0
Omission of this clause is consistent with the omission of the definition of the
term "information" as discussed above, and certainly limits the breadth of
information obtainable by the contracting states. However, this omission
may be in contravention of the requirement under Section 274(h)(c)(i),
which requires that information be provided which is "necessary
and
t
appropriate to carry out the tax laws of the United States."1 1
b. "Best Efforts"
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement, which authorizes the
competent authorities to establish "routine exchanges of information," has
been omitted from Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement. t0 2 Instead, the
Barbados Agreement contains paragraph 2 of Article 3 which provides that
the competent authority of the requested states "shall endeavor to provide
information upon request by the competent authority of the applicant state
for the purposes referred to in paragraph 1 [Article 3]."'103 This paragraph
also states that if information available in the tax files of the requested state
is not sufficient to enable compliance with the request, that state shall take
all relevant measures to provide the applicant state with the information
requested. 104 Therefore, what under paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Draft
Agreement would be an automatic transmittal of routine tax information,
97. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 1, Article 4
98. Barbados Agreement, supra note 83, paragraph 1, Article 3.
99. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 1, Article 4.
100. However, as was noted in the discussion in the text accompanying note 86, the provision
concerning applicability of the exchange-of-information agreement to nonresidents of either
contracting is included in paragraph I of Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement.
101. Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 1, Article 4).
102. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 2, Article 4.
103. Barbados Agreement, supra note 83, paragraph 2, Article 3.
104. Id.
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under the Barbados Agreement becomes a "best efforts" transmittal of
routine tax information with a somewhat less defined and discretionary
provision to effect the transmittal of nonroutine tax information.105
Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement further provides that
the competent authorities have the authority to obtain and provide information from financial institutions.' 0 6 Nevertheless, while the competent authorities have the authority to obtain such information, as was discussed in
the preceding paragraph, such authority is dependent upon the efforts
expended by the requested state in providing such information. Therefore,
if it is not politically expedient in Barbados to require financial institutions
to provide information concerning its customers, it is within the discretion
of the Minister of Finance and Planning in Barbados not to provide such
information and still not be in violation of the Barbados Agreement.
The Barbados Agreement, unlike the Draft Agreement, does not require
that any fact or statement, in any form whatsoever, that may be relevant or
material to tax administration and enforcement, including testimony, documents, records, or tangible personal property must be disclosed to the
contracting states. Moreover, the Barbados Agreement does not provide
that information to be disclosed includes information to effect the determination, assessment, and collection of tax, the recovery and enforcement
of tax claims, or the investigation or prosecution of tax crimes or crimes
involving the contravention of tax administration. Furthermore, as will be
discussed below, on other requests for information the contracting states
need only endeavor to provide the information requested, such contracting
states are not required to provide such information.
c. Transmission
Paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement, which authorizes a
competent authority of a contracting state to exchange information "spontaneously" with the competent authority of the other state, has been omitted from Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement.10 7 While such exchange, as
set forth in the Draft Agreement, is discretionary on the part of the competent authorities and must be relevant to, and bear significantly on, a tax
matter in the other state before such spontaneous exchange is initiated,
omission of this provision from the Barbados Agreement further vitiates
the effectiveness of the Barbados Agreement.1 0 Omission of both para105. It would appear that there will be no categorization of information as "routine" with
respect to the Barbados Agreement. Failure of such categorization will probably result in the
delayed processing to the contracting states of information deemed to be "routine" under the
Draft Agreement. For a discussion of what constitutes "routine" tax information, see the
discussion in text accompanying notes 51-57.
106. Id.
107. Paragraph 3, Article 4, Draft Agreement; see discussion in text accompanying notes
58-60.
108. Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 3, Article 4).
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graphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement from the Barbados
Agreement restricts the flow of both "routine" and "spontaneous" information between the contracting states, essentially putting the burden on the
contracting states to specifically request all information. 10 9 Nevertheless,
this omission is softened somewhat because in certain respects Article 26 of
the Treaty (the exchange-of-information provision contained therein)
appears to be stricter than the Barbados Agreement with respect to the
spontaneous flow of tax information between the U.S. and Barbados."
However, paragraph 1 of Article 26 of the Treaty states that the competent
authorities of the contracting states shall exchange such information as is
necessary for carrying out the provisions of the Treaty or of the domestic
laws of the contracting states concerning taxes covered by the Treaty insofar
as the taxation thereunder is in accordance with this Treaty, in particularfor
the prevention of fraud and invasion of such taxes. 111 Nevertheless, such a
mandate for exchange of information is still discretionary on the part of the
contracting states inasmuch as each state must determine the scope of what
information is "necessary" for carrying out the provisions of the Treaty or
the laws of the contracting states.
While the Treaty language appears to be more stringent than that contained in the Barbados Agreement, there are certain similarities between
the exchange-of-information provisions contained in the Treaty and the
Barbados Agreement. For instance, paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Treaty
states that
[i]f information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with [Article
26], the other Contracting State shall endeavor to obtain the information to which
the request relates in the same manner and to the same extent as if the tax of the
first-mentioned State were the tax of that other State and were being imposed by
that other State. If specifically requested by the competent authority of the other
Contracting State, the competent authority of the other Contracting State shall
endeavor to provide information under [Article 26] in the form of depositions of
witnesses and authenticated copies of unedited original documents (including
books, papers, statements, records, accounts, and writings), to the same extent
such depositions and documents can be obtained under2 the laws and administrative practices of that other State with its own taxes.1
This language is basically the same as paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the
Barbados Agreement, which is discussed below." 3 Therefore, it is not
improbable that while the Barbados Agreement is more inclusive than the
Treaty, the two agreements will probably be administered by the contracting states in a similar way as to exchange of information. This implies that
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 51-60.
Treaty, supra note 78, Article 26.
Treaty, supra note 78, paragraph 1, Article 26.
Treaty, supra note 78, paragraph 2, Article 26.
Barbados Agreement, supra note 83, paragraph 3, Article 3.
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information transmitted both under the Treaty and the Barbados Agreement will be dependent upon the strictness of interpretation of the contracting states to the provisions contained in the Treaty and the Barbados
Agreement.
d. Powers of Contracting State
Paragraph 4(a) of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement, which authorizes the
competent authority of the requested state to provide information upon
request by the competent authority of the applicant state for the purposes of
administering and enforcing the tax laws of the contracting states, has also
been omitted from the Barbados Agreement. Paragraph 4(a) of Article 4 of
the Draft Agreement states that if the information available in the tax files of
the requested state is not sufficient to enable compliance with the request,
that state shall take all relevant measures, including compulsory measures,
to provide the applicant state with the information requested. 114 Moreover,
specifically
the requested state shall have the authority to take certain
115
enumerated measures in order to obtain such information.
As can be seen, paragraph 4(a) of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement sets
forth the powers which should be available to the contracting states to satisfy
their obligations under an exchange-of-information agreement. The form
these powers take and the manner in which they are implemented, however,
1 16
The
is to be determined by each contracting state under its internal law.
purpose of this provision is to satisfy congressional intent that contracting
states have adequate process for obtaining information.117 It should be
noted that the U.S. already has adequate process under section 7601,
however, if the other contracting state does not have adequate process it
may enact measures providing such process pursuant to Article 8 of the
Draft Agreement. 118 Omission of paragraph 4(a) of Article 4 of the Draft
Agreement from the Barbados Agreement precludes the contracting states
from requiring compulsory measures to be taken by the requested state in
9
order to obtain relevant information from sources enumerated above."
This omission, in and of itself, does not run contrary to the Draft Agreement. The Comments to the Draft Agreement provide that a final agreement need not contain all of the provisions of the Draft Agreement in order
to be acceptable to the U.S. 120 As stated in the Comments, if the domestic

114. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 61-62.
115. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 4(a), Article 4.
116. Id.
117. Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 4(a), Article 4); see supra discussion in
text accompanying notes 61-62.
118. Id.
119. Id.; Article 8 of the Draft Agreement.
120. Comments to the Draft Agreement (Introduction).
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laws of each country authorize the tax authorities to take the actions specified in paragraph 4(a) of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement (relating to
compulsory measures for obtaining information), paragraph 4(a) may be
deleted with the understanding that such assistance is available on a reciprocal basis.' 21 Apparently, the Treasury Department is satisfied that adequate compulsory measures are available in Barbados,1 22 although as was
discussed above, omission of paragraph 4(a) of Article 4 of the Draft
Agreement from the Barbados Agreement makes such compulsory measures something less mandatory on the part of the contracting states.123
e. Effect of Bank Secrecy
Paragraph 4(b) of Article 4 which as was noted above may be the most
important provision contained in the Draft Agreement, 124 has been omitted
from the Barbados Agreement. 125 This paragraph states that bank secrecy
or other fiduciary internal laws of the contracting state shall not affect the
ability to provide tax information.' 26 While this provision need not be
included in a final exchange-of-information agreement if the internal law of
the contracting state does not have the effect of allowing bank secrecy or
undisclosed ownership of shares or securities, its omission from the Barbados Agreement is perplexing inasmuch as Barbados has bank secrecy laws
for all off-shore banks. 127 In Barbados, no statement, return or information
will be required by the Central Bank of Barbados with respect to the affairs
of any particular customer of an off-shore bank, but the Minister of Finance
and Planning may seek and be informed of the names of any customers who
are residents of Barbados. Moreover, no statement, returns or information
furnished or submitted by an off-shore bank will be communicated or
disclosed to any person other than the Central Bank of Barbados, the
Minister of Finance and Planning, and such public officers and other persons
as may be prescribed. 28 These provisions indicate, of course, that Barbados does have bank secrecy laws which probably preclude transmission of
information concerning off-shore bank customers to the U.S. Because Barbados does have bank secrecy laws which will have an impact on the
effectiveness of the Barbados Agreement, the omission of a clause comparable to paragraph 4(b) of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement from the BarbaId.
Foster & Pennick, supra note 80, at 102.
See discussion in text accompanying note 119 supra.
Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 4(b), Article 4.
See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 63-64.
Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 4(b), Article 4.
Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 4(b), Article 4); OFF-SHORE BUSINESS IN
BARBADOS 14 (March 1984); PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN BARBADOS 48 (1980).
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

128. OFF-SHORE BUSINESS IN BARBADOS 14 (March 1984); PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING

BUSINESS IN BARBADOS 48 (1980).
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dos Agreement could conceivably render the Barbados Agreement invalid
under U.S. law.
Furthermore, with respect to Barbados' bank secrecy laws, paragraph 3
of Article 26 of the Treaty stipulates that in no case shall the provisions
contained therein be construed so as to impose on a contracting state the
obligation: (a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the
laws and administrative practice of that or of the other contracting state;
(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the
normal course of the administration of that or of the other contracting state;
or (c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business,
industrial, commercial, or professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre
public).129
Because Barbados has bank secrecy laws, the above provisions under
Article 26 of the Treaty make it even more difficult for U.S. tax authorities
to obtain tax information concerning customers of Barbados' off-shore
banks. In the meantime, it can be conjectured that omission of the bank
secrecy provision from the Barbados Agreement connotes that Barbados
off-shore banking institutions will be maintaining their secrecy laws, and
with some degree of comfort
inbound investors to Barbados can place1 funds
30
that their anonymity will be respected.
f. Role of Privileges
Not only has paragraph 4(b) of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement been
omitted from the Barbados Agreement, the equally important paragraph
4(c) has also been omitted. 1 3 1 This provision, which states that privileges
under the laws of the applicant state shall not apply in the execution of a
request by the requested state but shall be preserved for resolution by the
applicant state, has as its purpose the prohibition of courts of the requested
state adjudicating the legality of privileges asserted under the laws of the
applicant state. 132 The omission of this provision means that U.S. privileges,
such as the attorney-client privilege, may be asserted by the Barbados
Minister of Finance and Planning or133the Barbados courts in order to deflect a
U.S. request for tax information.
g. Manner and Form
Paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement, which provides that if
information is requested by a contracting state pursuant to paragraph 4 of
129. Treaty, supra note 78, paragraph 3, Article 26.
130. But see Foster & Pennick, supra note 80, at 102.
131. See discussion in text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
132. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 4c, Article 4; Comments to the Draft
Agreement (paragraph 4(c), Article 4).
133. Comments to the Draft Agreement (paragraph 4(c), Article 4).
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Article 4 the requested state shall obtain the information requested in the
same manner, and provide it in the same form as if the tax of the applicant
state were the tax of the requested state and were being imposed by the
requested state, is included in the Barbados Agreement in a modified
form. 134

Because of the discretionary nature of the Barbados Agreement, the
effect of the Barbados Agreement on United States foreign investment or
corporate formation in Barbados for persons desiring to avoid governmental disclosure and maintaining their anonymity appears to be uncertain.
With respect to formation of an FSC or small FSC in Barbados, of course
there is no effect, because in order to obtain the tax benefits under the FSC
provisions, a corporation must be formed in a jurisdiction which is a posses134. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 67-68. Paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the
Draft Agreement requires that if specifically requested by the competent authority of the
applicant state, the requested state must: (1) specify the time and place for the taking of
testimony or the production of books, papers, records, and other tangible property; (2) place
the individual giving testimony or producing books, papers, records, and other tangible
property under oath; (3) permit the presence of individuals designated by the competent
authority of the applicant state as being involved in or affected by execution of the request,
including an accused, counsel for the accused, individuals charged with the administration and
enforcement of the domestic laws of the applicant state covered by the exchange-ofinformation agreement, and a commissioner or magistrate present for the purpose of rendering
evidentiary rulings or determining issues of privilege under the laws of the applicant state; (4)
provide individuals permitted to be present with an opportunity to question, directly or through
the executing authority, the individual giving testimony or producing books, papers, records,
and other tangible property; (5) secure original and unedited books, papers, and records, and
other tangible property; (6) secure or produce true and correct copies of original and unedited
books, papers, and records; (7) determine the authenticity of books, papers, and records, and
other tangible property produced; (8) examine the individual producing books, papers, and
records, and other tangible property regarding the purpose for which and the manner in which
the item produced is or was maintained; (9) permit the competent authority of the applicant
state to provide written questions to which the individual providing books, papers, and records,
and other tangible property is to respond regarding the item produced; (10) perform any other
act not in violation of the laws or at variance with the administrative practice of the requested
state; (11) certify either that procedures requested by the competent authority of the applicant
state were followed or that the procedures requested could not be followed, with an explanation
of the deviation and reason therefor. Paragraph 5, Article 4, Draft Agreement.
It should be noted that the procedures specified in (1)-(10) above relate to obtaining
information in a form that will permit the information to be admitted into evidence in a U.S.
court. 1TAX TREATIES (CCH) 175. The procedure specified in (11) as well as those specified in
(1)-(10) are intended to provide such "equivalent circumstantial guaranties of trustworthiness"
that a U.S. court may require no further certification or foundation to find the information thus
provided admissible in evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(24) or 804(5).
Moreover, the proponent of the information will be required to provide notice to an adverse
party pursuant to the above Rules of Evidence and Rule 12(d)(1), Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The party contesting the authenticity or trustworthiness of information so certified
will have the burden of establishing to the satisfaction of the court before which the proceeding
is pending, pursuant to a motion under Rule 12, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the
information is not genuine or reliable in order for such information to be excluded from
evidence on that ground. Id. The list of procedures set forth in (1)-(11) above are not exclusive
and therefore bilateral negotiations may result in the addition of other provisions to those listed
in order to provide information in a form required in a contracting state other than the U.S. Id.
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sion of the United States, a jurisdiction which has entered into an exchangeof-information agreement with the United States, or a jurisdiction which has
an income tax treaty with respect to which the Secretary of the Treasury
certifies that the exchange-of-information program with such country under
such treaty carries out the exchange-of-information requirements. However, with respect to setting up a Barbados corporation or utilizing the
offshore banking facilities of Barbados, a U.S. person would be welladvised to either form such corporation or enter into an offshore banking
relationship with a non-CBI country, or wait until the strictness of Barbados
enforcement of the Barbados Agreement becomes apparent.
As for Barbados investors in the United States, the United States will
either strictly enforce the provisions contained in the Barbados Agreement
or enforce them only as strictly as Barbados enforces the Barbados Agreement with respect to information the United States requests from Barbados.
It is unlikely that the provisions contained in Article 26 of the Treaty will
alter this conclusion due to the similarity between the Treaty and the
Barbados Agreement. The investor should wait, unless business circumstances necessitate otherwise, prior to investing in the U.S. in order to
determine the degree of enforcement of the Barbados Agreement by U.S.
authorities.
In older U.S. income tax treaties, exchange-of-information provisions did
not specify the form in which that information had to be presented. 135 This
meant that certain information obtained pursuant to such exchange-ofinformation provisions could not be introduced into court as evidence. That
specific in the
is why paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement is so136
states.
contracting
the
between
provided
be
information to
However, paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement is much
more narrow in the types of information which may be requested than the
Draft Agreement. Therefore, information provided under paragraph 3 of
Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement may not be in a form admissible or
deemed trustworthy under the U.S. judicial system. If this is the case, the
effectiveness of this provision in accomplishing the objectives as stated in
Article 1 of the Draft Agreement is questionable.
h. Other
Paragraph 6 of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement is for the most part
37
duplicated in paragraph 4 of Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement.'
135. Foster & Pennick, supra note 80, at 102. For example, in X and Y Bank v. The Swiss
FederalTax Administration,76-1 T.C. 9452 (1973), the Swiss Supreme Court determined that
"while Swiss tax authorities were required to provide tax information to U.S. authorities under
the 1953 U.S.-Swiss income tax treaty, there was no obligation to provide it in a form
admissible in a U.S. tax court." Id.
136. Id.
137. See supra, discussion in the text accompanying notes 69 and 71. This paragraph provides
that information-gathering requirements are not intended to impose on a contracting state the
SUMMER 1985

970

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

Paragraph 7 of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement is the same as paragraph 5
of Article 3 of the Barbados Agreement. 138 Paragraph 8 of Article 4 of the

Draft Agreement has been omitted from the Barbados Agreement. 139 This
provision provides that the competent authority of the requested state shall
allow representatives of the applicant state to enter the requested state to
interview individuals and examine books and records with the consent of
individuals contacted. 140 Omission of this provision from the Barbados
Agreement will make it more difficult for an applicant state to gather

information from a requested state.
Paragraph 9 of Article 4 of the Draft Agreement, which requires that

information received by a contracting state be treated as a secret in the same
manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that state (with
the use of such information pertaining solely to such internal domestic legal
limitations), has been adopted as paragraph 6 of Article 3 of the Barbados
Agreement with one addition. 14 The Barbados Agreement further reobligation to engage in any activities which result in any of the following activities, except as
otherwise provided in the Draft Agreement and the Barbados Agreement: (a) to carry out
administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of that State or of
the other Contracting State; (b) to supply particular items of information which are not
obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration of that State or of the
other Contracting State; (c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business,
industrial, commercial, or professional secret or trade process; (d) to supply information, the
disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public); (e) to supply information
requested by the applicant State to administer or enforce a provision of the tax law of the
applicant State, or any requirement connected therewith, which discriminates against a national of the requested State. A provision of tax law, or connected requirement, will be
considered to be discriminatory against a national of the requested State if it is more burdensome with respect to a national of the requested State than with respect to a national of the
applicant State in the same circumstances. For purposes of the preceding sentence, a national of
the applicant State who is subject to tax on worldwide income is not in the same circumstances
as a national of the requested State who is not subject to tax on worldwide income.
The Barbados Agreement further provides that the provisions of subparagraph (e) shall not
be construed to prevent the exchange of information with respect to:
(1) The taxes imposed by Barbados on branch profits, and on the premium income of
nonresident insurers or foreign insurance companies (at the rates prescribed under the Income
Tax Act); or
(2) Any additional tax imposed by the U.S. on the income of a permanent establishment
maintained by a resident of Barbados in the U.S. The scope of the limitations imposed on the
contracting states under the provisions contained in this paragraph and the preceding paragraph is dependent upon the internal laws of the contracting states, and therefore may further
constrict a free flow of tax information between the contracting states. Draft Agreement, supra
note 36, paragraph 6, Article 4; Barbados Agreement, supra note 83, paragraph 4, Article 3.
138. See supra discussion in text accompanying note 72. This provision imposes the obligation on the contracting states to use all legal means and best efforts to obtain requested
information, except as otherwise provided, and even to that information which is not required
to be disclosed, to disclose such information if in their discretion, the contracting states want to
transmit such information. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 7, Article 4; Barbados
Agreement, supra note 83, paragraph 5, Article 3.
139. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 72-73.
140. Paragraph 8, Article 4, Draft Agreement.
141. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 72, 74, and 75.
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quires that information not be disclosed to any third jurisdiction for any
purpose without
the consent of the contracting state originally furnishing the
142
information.
5. Additional Provision
The Barbados Agreement contains another provision which is not contained in the Draft Agreement. This is Article 5 which provides that the
Barbados Agreement is consistent with the standards for an exchange-ofinformation agreement described in section 274(h)(6)(C) (relating to deduction for attendance at foreign conventions), and section 927(e)(3)(A) (relating to foreign sales corporations). 143 Absence of paragraph 4(b) of Article 4
of the Draft Agreement from the Barbados Agreement makes this statement questionable.
6. Summary Observations
The Barbados Agreement is a diluted version of the Draft Agreement,
particularly because under the Barbados Agreement the bank secrecy rules
still apply. Moreover, because many of the provisions contained in the
Barbados Agreement are discretionary rather than mandatory on the part of
the enforcing authorities of both contracting states, the Barbados Agreement's impact on investment, banking and corporate formation in Barbados
will not be known until the Barbados Agreement is actually enforced. In all
probability, the degree of enforcement of the Barbados Agreement by
Barbados authorities will be determined by the tax benefits derived by
Barbados with respect to the CBI and foreign sales corporation provisions.
For instance, if conventions are not held in Barbados and/or foreign sales
corporations are not formed in Barbados, in meaningful numbers, Barbados
authorities may be loathe to enforce the discretionary provisions of the
Barbados Agreement or to interpret other provisions strictly, since the
revenues from the CBI and foreign sales corporation provisions may not
compensate Barbados from the other losses in revenue. Therefore, the
effect of the Barbados Agreement on investors from contracting states will
remain unknown until the Barbados Agreement is actually administered by
the contracting states.
IV. Conclusion
The apparent benefit of the tax provisions of the Act-deductibility for
Caribbean Basin conventions-may in reality represent a token consolation
142. Draft Agreement, supra note 36, paragraph 9, Article 4; Barbados Agreement, supra
note 83, paragraph 6, Article 3.
143. Barbados Agreement, supra note 83, paragraph 5.
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to the quidpro quo: significant if not over-broad U.S. tax discovery powers
in favor of the U.S. Treasury Department. The exchange-of-information
powers contained in the Draft Agreement, coupled with the lack of significant and meaningful safeguards, project an unequivocal signal of the
U.S. Treasury Department that no Caribbean internal law regarding bank
secrecy and corporate ownership rules will be legally respected. However,
the signals with regard to the Draft Agreement are at some variance with the
more relaxed provisions or the Barbados Agreement. Nevertheless, structuring U.S. investments by foreign investors via companies organized under
the laws of Caribbean Basin countries with which the U.S. has consummated exchange-of-information agreements under the Act, including Barbados, generally should be avoided, assuming the foreign investors desire to
avoid governmental disclosure and otherwise maintain their anonymity.
Similarly, the practitioners should carefully evaluate the potential disclosure consequences of proposed CBI investments of U.S. companies in such
countries. On the other hand, in representing U.S. corporate clients, the
CBI amendments to the Internal Revenue Code represented a taxadvantaged business opportunity to hold conventions and seminars in CBI
countries which meet the CBI exchange-of-information and other requirements for deductibility under section 274(h).
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